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Over the last ftw years, perceptions of the importance of eHealth have increased rapidly, together 
with the use oflS&T in the delivery of health and social services. Although U e " approaches to health 
and social services have much potentia/' they are not panaceas, and the use of new technologies in 
improving the 4/iciency and t!(/foctiveness of such systems cannot be considered in isolation .from their 
wider context. eHealth systems remain complex socio-organisational systems and, as we will argue 
and illustrate through this case study, require that a balanced approach to ftasibility and desirability 
analysis be taken. 
The case study in this paper describes aftasibility study into the potential4jectiveness of a smart-
device-based electronic data collection and payment system which was proposedfor the provision if 
disability services. A key finding of the study was that the most significant impediment to such a system 
was the highly diffitsed, .fragmented, interlocking organisational structure of the social service 
administration itself. Rather than raise issues specific to the implementation or diffitsion of new 
technologies in designing e-health services, it raised issues associated with decision making and 
control in such an environment, and with the design of the underlying organisational system:for 
service provision, the level of detail required in the service data, and the locus of decision-making 
power among the stakeholders. 
In our account we illustrate the existence of multiple, incommensurate but valid perceptions of the 
human service provision problem, and discuss the implications for developers or managers if 
i"!formation systems in the arena of e-health or governance. We examine this environment .from 
sociological and i'!formation systems perspectives, and cof!firm the us¢tlness ofsocio-organisational 
approaches in understanding such contexts. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THJE.HEALTH ENVIRONMEN 
The non-institutionalised provision of human (health and social) services by a State government is 
necessarily a geographically and organisationally distributed activity. Such an activity sets a range of 
interest groups, with a variety of requirements - which, in general, are not fully reconcilable - within a 
single problem context. Government-run healthcare systems and others, which are large-scale and 
include many divisions and linked organisations, confront several challenges deriving from the varied 
(and sometimes contradictory) interests of the parties involved. 
There are many stakeholder groups: service recipients, direct care providers and the organisations that 
employ them, the organisation that administers the whole system and, in many cases, the government 
that directs policy and funding decisions which underpin the whole approach to health and social 
services JI"ovision. Members of each of these groups have their own interests and goals and while 
these are usually not irreconcilable, they are not always in harmony. In some cases there may be quite 
considerable tensions as, for example, the administrators' and accountants' needs to measure 
productivity, plan budgets and contain costs and the needs of recipients for high quality and 
appropriate services. This may involve different perspectives on both the level of service as well as 
individual choice of service options. There are potential conflicts among stakeholders over the 
balance between accountability and organisational information needs and the privacy of individual 
information and freedom from stigma. The context of service provision is complex as is the 
relationship between the service providers and their clients, often a long-term relationship. An 
effective information system for such an organisation should help to manage the informal and tacit 
knowledge that is distributed among many stakeholders and is highly contextual. In an area where 
there is such sensitivity and the personal and interpersonal issues are so central to the well-being of the 
clients, eHealth initiatives have the potential to be positive but also disruptive, with negative 
consequences for vulnerable clients. 
There has been great interest on the part of government in the use of information technology in 
healthcare delivery, as a mechanism to improve quality, access, and improve efficiencies. Its use in 
restructuring healthcare delivery (Geisler, 2001; More and McGrath, 2002) has been indispensable, 
but it also raises cultural and ethical issues associated with patient care (Moore, 1994). 
1.1 Social services provision in a dispersed network 
Our team of researchers was engaged to conduct a feasibility study for one section of an Australian 
government department which provided health and related social services. We were asked to assess 
whether an eHealth solution (possibly the use of a smartcardlsmartdevice based system to document 
health and social services as they were provided to the clients) could provide better quality data and 
more effective reporting than the existing system - helping those agencies which actually provided the 
services to report against their obligations under their service contracts. This conceptualisation of the 
study was driven by government concerns about system inefficiency and inaccuracy and the need for 
service planning. In essence, the proposal under scrutiny was that sophisticated technology be used to 
achieve efficiency, accuracy and financial accountability in the provision of services. 
The team held a series of consultations with Bureau staff in the service management and IT areas (11), 
Agency managers (9), direct care providers employed by one of he Agencies (5), Clients (5) and 
representatives of client advocacy groups (3). Members of 4 other provider organisations were also 
interviewed. All information collected was treated confidentially by the team, and the participants 
were fairly candid and informative as a result. The consultations yielded a thorough understanding of 
the range of practices and solid insights into the various perspectives and interests of the groups. 
There were three major stakeholder groups in this context: 
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• The government department of State Services ('The Bureau') included a centrally-located head 
office and a number of regional offices. It assessed applicants for care and determined the level of 
their care entitlement. It was responsible to the Minister for State Socia I Services and accountable 
through her for appropriate support to people needing disability care. Prudent and economical 
expenditure of public funds to achieve these aims was a prime political goal of the Government. 
• Independent (non-government) Agencies which were contracted to provide care to the recipients. 
They were paid in advance for services to be provided and the accounts were subsequently 
reconciled on the receipt of delivery data. The Agencies employed staff (often non-skilled and 
hourly-paid) to provide the services either in a care centre or in the homes of the recipients. 
• The Clients, who were people with a range of disabilities from motor-muscular impairment to 
severe intellectual disability. Most were reported to have multiple disabilities. The majority of 
Clients required family carers to manage for them as a result of their intellectual disability. 
Several welfare and advocacy groups provided support and advice to the Clients and represented 
them in political forums. 
At the time of this study government policy throughout Australia was oriented toward reducing the 
size of the public sector, which often involved greater reliance on outsourcing. The context for this 
feasibility study was, therefore, multi-organisational. Given the wide range of stakeholders in the 
system, and the nature of the domain area, we felt in important to assemble a team with an appropriate 
range of perspectives and skills. The team therefore had two co-lead analysts: one was a traditional 
systems analyst by trailing, the other a sociologist. A number of assistant analysts with information 
systems backgrounds also participated. 
Overall responsibility for the system was held by the Bureau which: 
• evaluated individuals' eligibility to receive services; 
• contracted with provider Agencies (often charities) to supply servIces to those people with 
disabilities who had been evaluated and allocated a benefit; and 
• maintained a waiting list of eligible individuals and allocated them to a suitable place as places 
became availa ble within the system. 
1.2 The existing service provision system 
The existing administrative practices involved paper-based capture of data at the point of delivery by 
the Agencies with electronic summaries of services provided on a ().monthly basis. This system was 
acknowledged to be laborious and inaccurate with considerable problems of interoperability between 
Agency systems and a variety of systems used by Bureau branches. It was not easy to use and often 
the data that was submitted did not conform to the required format and was thus unable to be read at 
all; data from the various providers could not be amalgamated for analysis and storage. 
The care system was extensive and even the two programs the researchers were asked to examine 
served 5,500 clients through over 300 outlets. The two programs were designed to provide support for 
people who suffered disabilities which made it difficult to manage daily life. One program, 'Day and 
Respite Care' (DARC) provided a program of activities, training and a safe environment for clients 
during the day, usually in a centre but activities were often conducted elsewhere. Clients commonly 
attended programs with the same organisation for years on end. Most DARC users were intellectually 
disabled and many had multiple disabilities and behavioural problems. Contracts between the Bureau 
and a DARC agency were not written in respect of individual clients. Instead, blanket contracts were 
written to provide care places for a specified number of people for a number of months. A client was 
listed as a recipient of care by a particular agency, often one which specialised in his type of disability 
and, were slbe to leave this agency, slbe would go back on the waiting list. This was a major barrier 
preventing people 'shopping around' or changing Agencies and the Bureau was concerned that clients 
should have choice and flexibility in their service providers. 
223 
The second program, 'Home Based Support' (HBS) was typically accessed by people with mobility 
problems (such as paraplegia or muscular dystrophy). Many HBS clients had no intellectual or other 
disabilities although all were seriously and irreversibly disabled. Care was provided for a designated 
time during the day (such as help with bathing and dressing). HBS care could also be provided 
outside the home such as with help with shopping. Because this type of support was provided 
flexibly, clients could choose which agency supplied their care. Some did 'shop around' but in many 
areas there were few agencies and thus, not much effective choice. 
1.3 The Perceived Problem 
A number of attempts had been made earlier to bring together a coherent system of data reporting 
across programs but there was still concern by members of the Bureau that they received incomplete 
and inaccurate data from the Agencies on service provision and that they might be paying for services 
that had not, in fact, been delivered. In a system where there was pressure on funding (and waiting 
lists for services), any such inefficiency would have a negative effect on the delivery of care. In line 
with government policy and legislation, the Bureau wished to move to quality service provision 
centred on the recipients and to empower them to fmd service from the providers that best met their 
needs. Thus, rather than being obliged to access their care services from a designated provider 
agency, clients would increasingly choose both services and service providers to suit their needs, a 
situation that would require more effective management of knowledge both about a Client's needs but 
also about a complex and changing array of services used. 
The Bureau was seeking a better mechanism to capture the provision of services that they expected to 
become increasingly flexible under the policy principles of client empowerment and choice. They 
sought an information system that would supply client data to the various Regional Bureaus (some 
clients - mainly those living close to regional boundaries - accessed services through more than one 
Region) and would support their planning, performance monitoring, administration and management 
of contracts with the Agencies. The information system to be developed would also need to be 
affordable, easy to use and reliable. The goal of the Bureau was to exert more control over a large and 
diverse sector by gaining more accurate and timely data on service provision. This, they hoped, would 
enable better allocation of resources, cost saving and greater accountability from Agencies. 
The perspective of the Agencies was very different. The funding they received from the Bureau was 
often barely sufficient to cover the demands for their services so they had little budgetary margin. 
They experienced considerable difficulties complying with the Bureau's reporting requirements and 
several romplained about errors and malfunctions in the lodging of reports because of the Bureau's 
format. The lag time between data reporting and reconciliation of accounts was also problematic for 
their planning. The Agencies we consulted (6 in total) reported few difficulties in maintaining data on 
serVice provision but many difficulties in reporting this on to the Bureau. 
The response of the Agencies' management to the proposal for an electronic data collection system 
was cool (and in some cases strongly opposed). They objected to the mismatch between such a highly 
specified system and the way it would conceptualise service delivery and the actual context in which 
service was delivered. In one DARC agency this problem was vividly described! by a long-standing 
member of its staff. 
Although a service is defined as 'attendance', this may not reflect the real costs of 
providing that service, especially if it is disrupted and extra work or fmancial outlay is 
required to deal with the disruption. For example, many of our clients' disabilities 
! All the quotations provided here have been constructed from handwritten notes of one or more team members taken during the interviews. 
They do not have the accuracy of a verbatim transcription but are correct in both content (what they describe) and in flavour (the speakers' 
emotive emphasis). 
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mean that they have behavioural problems and can become violent. So, say we're 
getting a group ready to get onto a bus for an outing. One person has a behavioural 
incident. He hits another client and breaks a bus window. We have to send him home 
(he obviously can't continue on the excursion in that condition). We have to get the 
person he hit to a doctor which requires getting an extra staff member called in. We 
also have to get the window ftxed. It's not out of the question that this incident may 
trigger other behaviours among the others who are waiting, some of whom may have to 
be sent home. In the scenario you're painting [of the single data entry for a service] 
we're trying, in the middle of this chaos, to manage wiping everyone's smartcards. 
The Centre has, maybe, 3 cancellations plus several extra costs. How does that help us 
deliver service or our clients to get better service? 
This raised the question of what data to collect in an electronically-based system. The service 
categories were not well categorised and did not relate closely to the actual activities that were 
performed at the DARC centres. Capturing the knowledge about attendance at DARC facilities on a 
daily basis was seen as relatively trivial since clients enrolled for sessions several weeks long on either 
a full-time or part-time basis. There were rules about attendance levels and if a client was absent for 
more than a few sessions, they risked forfeiting their place, which would then be allocated to another 
person on the waiting list. These Bureau rules, designed to keep the system operating at or near 
capacity, presented some difficulties for the DARC Agencies. A client might decide to discontinue 
attendance for a time, either unaware of the longer-term consequences, or because their decisions were 
shaped by emotional or non-rational factors (not unlike the population in general but often exacerbated 
by intellectual disability). Several Agency staff reported cases similar to the following 
We had a young intellectually-disabled man who was quite happy at the Centre. But 
his father wasn't too happy about that and this got worse as the kid got older. I don't 
know what the father's problems might have been but he absolutely insisted that his 
son leave the Centre and 'grow up' . We'd known the son for years and we knew it 
wouldn't work for long - he required just too much care and he couldn't become what 
his father hoped. We told his father that he'd need a place again soon and that taking 
him out would put him back on the waiting list and all. But the father could not be 
persuaded. What could we do? Well, we didn't notify a vacancy and in the meantime 
we were able to include a person travelling from interstate - we identifted them 
through rontacts with colleagues. Of course, within a few months the young man did 
return as we knew he had to, but he would have forfeited his place had we strictly 
adhered to the rules. 
The professional staff in the Agencies had to manage these absences knowing that the client would 
need and want to return later but not within the time stipulated by Bureau regulations. Conversely, 
Clients often arrived at the DARC on days they weren't scheduled to attend, because they were 
confused about the day or simply wanted to be there. Because of their dependency, agency staff rarely 
turned them away but the agency incurred some additional costs in providing for these unanticipated 
attendees. DARC agencies had limited control over the number of clients they provided care for and 
limited flexibility in adjusting their outlays for supplies and staff (who had to be engaged ahead of 
time and for a specifted period). Agency managers juggled these contingencies in order to satisfy the 
care needs of their clients, the demanding budgetary constraints and the employment needs of the staff 
they relied on. Their solutions were sometimes creative but, in our view, always oriented to the goal 
of providing appropriate care for as many clients as possible. 
The HBS program had fewer problems with clients' behaviour. Its clients usually could competently 
conduct their own care management. Many planned ahead and saved some of their service allocation 
for times when they anticipated greater need. The HBS agencies typically provided them with 
monthly accounts. On the face of it, the HBS program seemed well suited to electronic data capture 
and management. However, when we asked about an electronic data recording system, both direct 
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care providers and HBS clients were vociferous in their opposition. They both saw such a system as 
an undesirable attempt to monitor the care providers more closely by getting them to 'clock in'. 
In the HBS program (as with DARC) there was evidence of considerable unofficial flexibility to meet 
the clients' needs. Direct care providers reported that they would provide additional, uncharged 
service to clients when circumstances required this. Agency managers frowned on this practice and 
Bureau staff seemed largely unaware of it, but the relationships between care providers and care 
recipients were often valued by both of them and a degree of give and take seemed to suit both. There 
were a number of other programs in the social services area that had implemented electronic systems 
for keeping track of service (the measure was minutes of service provision). These programs provided 
domiciliary support to a broader clientele and were reported to work well. But the HBS care providers 
we spoke with found this system offensive and one told us she would not work in such a system, even 
though the pay was higher, because she did not want to forfeit the degree of autonomy she had in her 
job. Some clients also rejected electronic recording - often cast by them as "monitoring" - as being 
inconsistent with the relationships of trust that had developed between them and their care providers. 
The effective operation of the system depended to a significant extent on the dedication and sense of 
vocation of the direct care providers. An intrusive, disciplinary data collection system would do 
serious damage if it disrupted that dedication and the agencies were well aware of this. 
Our carers are chosen for their professionalism. The HBS focus is about assisting 
people whose daily living is compromised and it is especially important to maintain the 
individual's dignity. If such staff are not treated with respect by the agency, they will 
not continue the work. It takes a very special person to get up at 6am, drive for half 
and hour in the dark to wipe someone's bum for a modest wage. If they're given 
decent wages, trust and their professionalism is recognised, they will provide good 
service and deal with the agency honestly. There is a difference from other home-help 
schemes which provide short pieces of assistance such as those run by local 
government. 
A more fme-grained data collection system would create problems for both DARC and HBS 
Agencies. A more precise system, they believed, would have the dual effect of reducing the level of 
service to clients while creating a stuation in which DARe centre could only lose (when clients did 
not attend) while additional service (to those who attended for extra sessions) could not be recognised 
as it would exceed their allocated benefit. Importantly, it would erode their ability b manage the 
complexities involved in providing care to people whose lives cannot easily fit into the logic of 
bureaucratic order. 
In addition to the data collection issues, there were significant usability issues in the proposed 
electronic data collection systems, especially for intellectually disabled clients. One of the mooted 
solutions was the use of smart cards to collect and store service data. As a data storage device a smart 
card has much to recommend it. As a device to be understood, remembered, carried and used by 
clients, it presented an unmanageable challenge. We discovered that many direct care providers (often 
not highly educated) and very many clients (often intellectually disabled) did not understand or use 
such devices as magnetic strip cards or credit cards. At that time, at least, the training costs for 
introducing such a system would have been high. Further, one DARC centre reported that the daily 
loss rate of (non-electronic) ID cards issued to clients attending a program outside the centre 
approached 100%. Replacement costs for electronic devices at even a fraction of that rate would have 
been prohibitive. Alternative devices (such as chips embedded in jewellery) were seen as 
unacceptable because they were socially stigmatising. In any case, the current system of paper-based 
data on service provision was judged to be sufficiently accurate, usable and flexible between direct 
carers and the agencies. 
It was not possible (for ethical and practical reasons) to consult with a broad lange of clients. The 
clients and their carers with whom we were able to speak were very satisfied with the Agencies and 
the individuals who provided their care. They reported few problems in keeping track of their service 
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allocations or receiving appropriate care. But they were largely unaware of the services they might be 
able to access or the rules governing their access to care~ This information was often provided by 
Agency staff but as it was not officially part of their role, it was a matter of luck whether clients were 
fully informed. The knowledge requirements of a client were not ftxed and a change in their 
circumstances for any reason meant that new issues would arise and they would need to access other 
sources of support. 
The Bureau was aware of these needs and was working towards a person-based system of service 
provision. The transition to this approach was hampered by the lack of a universal case management 
system for clients. Some clients managed their own cases or had family members who could do this, 
some had a Bureau-appointed case manager and some received assistance from an Agency but this did 
not cover all clients by any means. Another factor which hampered the accessibility of information 
was the complexity of the system of service provision. This was structured into a series of support 
programs which were not unifted into seamless service provision. Some of the Bureau and Agency 
people we consulted claimed that this was partly the result of the political pressure on Ministers and 
governments to produce initiatives to demonstrate government action in social service provision. A 
new program could be launched with considerable fanfare whereas incremental improvements were 
far less newsworthy. This resulted in the complex, unintegrated and changing system of care which 
was opaque to many of the recipients and a problem for knowledge management on the basis of a 
person's care provision rather than a program or agency basis. 
1.4 Reconceptualising The Problem 
As we delved more deeply into the study, we became increasingly convinced that the 
conceptualisation of the study - as a study of the feasibility of an eHealth solution to recording and 
reporting on the delivery of services - was unhelpful. Issues of health and human service provision 
are, of course, highly controversial. They were the subject of debate about public policy in 
professional and media forums and were the focus of partisan political debates in parliamentary 
forums. It was clear that there were several important stakeholder groups which each took a different 
view of the issues and would need to be consulted about any recommendations for a change in the 
system. We chose, therefore, to adopt an approach to socio-technical analysis founded on Soft 
Systems Methodology (SSM) (see, eg, Checkland 1981; Checkland and Scholes, 1990; Checkland and 
Holwell, 1998) to analyse this context. 
SSM is a methodology well suited to identifying and understanding the multiple perspectives and 
conflicts which exist within a problem context, as well as developing ways of accommodating the 
various interests. One of the more useful techniques of SSM is the Rich Picture which, though 
freeform and rather unstructured in nature, offers a basis for visualising a complex problem context. 
The Rich Picture shown in Figure I summarises the data which we collected during this study and 
described above. 
2. ANALYSING THE CAE 
2.1 Accountability, organisational goals and quality care 
The stakeholders in this system had overlapping but at times competing goals. The Bureau needed to 
ensure the overall integrity of the system of care and to manage the competing demands for scarce 
resources. The political pressures for small government and efficiency meant that they needed to be 
sure that funding for care was spent appropriately and that the Bureau and the minister responsible for 
it could document this. In fact, we neither found nor heard of any evidence that Agencies were 
abusing the system by providing lower service than stipulated in their contracts, although it would not, 
by any means, have been impossible for an Agency to do so given the problems of the reporting and 
data management system. If a case of Agency mismanagement of funds had arisen and been made 
public, this would have been embarrassing for the Bureau and the Minister and potentially detrimental 
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to the needs of other clients and the agencies that provided their care. Thus, the goal of the Bureau to 
have an accurate system of service data reporting and management was a reasonable one, even if the 
proposed solution was not feasible. 
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Figure 1: Rich Picture of the proposed e-health system environment 
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The goals of the Agencies were also complex. While they were primarily oriented to providing 
services to their clients, they were also obliged to manage their relationship with the Bureau, with their 
staff, and with the clients. These relationships could not always be managed as they might have 
managed the provision of other goods or services because of the nature of the service provided. This 
involved both a duty of care to clients, independent of the rules and entitlements. It also involved 
relationships that could not be contained by the formality of bureaucratic provisions and the sense of 
vocation that many agency staff had about their jobs. The Agencies' interest in a good knowledge 
management system was dominated by their need for flexibility in dealing with the unpredictable lives 
of the people to whom they provided services. The main concern of this stakeholder group was their 
need to manage a care facility, unhindered by rigid data and reporting requirements. In this context, 
accuracy and effectiveness were not synonymous. 
The main goal of the clients was to access the services that they needed to help them and their families 
deal with the demands of their volatile lives. They needed to know what was available to them, what 
their benefit balances were and where they might go for assistance. The interests of the clients as a 
group were in an efficient and effective system that would help spread the available funding as 
equitably and widely as possible. To the extent that a knowledge management system could help 
achieve this, it was a benefit. If it resulted in a straight-jacketed set of rules that was unresponsive to 
their changing needs and deprived them of the care to which they were entitled and needed, it was no 
benefit to them at all. 
2.2 Making decisions based on dispersed and fragmented data 
Our initial brief, based as it was solely on the Bureau's perception of the problem context, was the 
investigation of a system of data capture at point of delivery of the service. Such an approach can 
readily be seen as the capture of fme-grained data which could (at least in principle) be used by the 
Bureau to monitor the services actually delivered by the Agencies - indeed, providing the necessary 
data to allow them to pay Agencies directly for specific services validly provided. It would also, in 
principle, allow the systems to be modified so that clients might freely select service provider on an 
instance-by-instance basis, if desired. Such an approach would impose the Bureau's perspective on all 
the actors within the problem context - effectively centralising decision making and imposing strict 
bureaucratic management (management by regulation) on the service provision system. Choice of 
service provider would be offered to the individual clients (subject to alternative providers being 
available) but it is not clear how clients would access the information required to make effective 
choices. It is not, however, clear that such a system would allow the Agencies to organise their 
workforce effectively. Thus, it might, through increased manpower costs, be expected to raise the cost 
of each individual service delivery), reducing overall service provision. 
The information granularity issue presented significant problems. Much of the service information 
provided to the Bureau was extremely coarse-grained (e.g., some providers were required to acquit 
their entire budgets on a bi-annual cycle) while other parts of the system were very fme-grained (e.g., 
other providers were expected to provide data on service provision in small, specific time chunks). At 
issue in both cases was whether the given level of granularity was appropriate. In general, the Bureau 
was pushing for fmer levels of granularity <f service data collection in all cases whereas the Providers 
preferred a more coarse grained focus that would give them greater flexibility in management. The 
clients' focus, in contrast, was on access to services and with building and maintaining access to the 
patchwork of services that could support their lives in the community. The granularity issue for them 
was important only insofar as they could ensure adequate support; otherwise, it was irrelevant at best 
and intrusive at worst. 
While defming, collecting and analysing data at a fme degree of granularity can be a benefit in a 
highly-defmed, predictable context where the environmental variables are well known, in this complex 
health and human services context, finer granularity of control would have produced few benefits (in 
terms of better system understanding and better management tools) and would have been 
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counterproductive to understanding the needs of the service recipients and attaining the ultimate goals 
of the system. Coarse levels of granularity of control are important where the services delivered 
involve holistic care and where the recipients are highly dependent because of their physical or 
intellectual characteristics. Even in this context, service provision where the end-users have greater 
power, where the delivered service is routine and defined and where the service context is relatively 
independent of other needs is more suitable for a fmer granularity of control (e.g., routine domiciliary 
services), though even these systems may be deceptive and incorporate a higher degree of flexibility 
and negotiation than their designers and managers are aware. 
The problem is exacerbated where silo structures obscure information from the end-users and where 
their needs are highly individualistic and changing (e.g., DARC programs). A multitude of separate 
and overlapping schemes of service provision, each with its own administrative structure, rendered the 
system as a whole unintelligible to all but those expert in its mysteries. These schemes were designed 
to provide specific services (for example a scheme to provide cleaning and home maintenance, another 
to provide assistance with personal care, another for home refitting and mobility aids, etc.). The 
schemes could be based on a variety of cross-cutting principles (e.g., schemes to assist people with 
particular disabilities, schemes for people whose disabilities had been acquired through accidents at 
work, schemes for young people). 
While the Bureau seemed to be getting the 'right story for the wrong reasons', given the inadequacy of 
the information system, many clients experienced a serious lack of information about the system as a 
whole and what they might reasonably request in the way of support. Access to this knowledge was 
far from miversal and needed to be better provided in a more open, integrated and transparent system. 
A knowledge management based approach needs to support individuals making decisions at a level in 
the system where they are most in touch with the complex, non-routine and even chaotic events that 
affect the lives of people who suffer illness or incapacity. 
• Clients and their representatives need knowledge that will help them formulate their service 
requests and manage their use of their service quantum. 
• Providers need knowledge to manage their client mix, their staffmg levels and their service 
provision profiles over time. 
• The Bureau needed knowledge to ensure the integrity of the whole system, to plan future 
provision arrangements and to identify non-performing providers, overlaps and gaps in service 
provision, inequities emerging in the system and inefficiencies in service provision arrangements 
Control, in a complex social system, is always difficult. Many control strategies have been developed, 
though none are entirely satisfactory. Traditionally, governments (like many other organisations) have 
adopted a bureaucratic management strategy and, with damage limitation in mind, develop ever more 
elaborate sets of rules and regulations to limit discretionary decision making (and, through such 
discretion) potentially hard-to-justify decisions made low within the hierarchy. The approach data 
collection suggested by the Bureau aimed, consistent with this strategy, to increase centralised control. 
The weakness of such a system of control in a social situation is the difficulty of predicting (and 
therefore covering within the set of rules and regulations) all the decisions which might be necessary. 
It is clear that, in many instances associated with the provision of human services to the disabled, 
effective decisions require specific but potentially unpredictable case information and must be made 
promptly. Whereas bureaucratic rule-following and fine-grained data management serve the needs of 
those organisationally and politically accountable for an efficient system, those at the care delivery end 
require the flexibility of a system that allows them to exercise judgment on their own or others' behalf 
'On the ground' rather than 'head-office' control (though transparent and auditable) is essential in order 
to ensure the system meets the needs of those it was designed to serve. 
The difficulty of making informed decisions within the system of human service provision was, in our 
view, the key problem. A resolution of this problem is possible through knowledge management, an 
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approach which can, by effectively supporting distributed but transparent decision-making throughout 
the system, combine flexibility of action with control. 
3. TOWARDS EFFECTIVB>ISPERSED DECISON MAKING 
Once we had discarded the possibility of instituting a more detailed level of bureaucratic control (rule 
enforcement) as an effective solution to the perceived problem, we had, in effect, rejected increased 
centralisation of control. We were, then, drawn to consider whether we could find an accommodation 
acceptable to all parties through an approach based on a form of managed delegation of responsibility 
- from, in effect, a decentralisation strategy. Such a strategy might be effective if decisions were 
made by individuals who: 
• had the necessary knowledge - both 
• explicit knowledge - of the rules and regulations 
• tacit knowledge - of the specific case 
• were accountable. 
The importance of the first of these conditions is clear - it has been discussed extensively above -
consistently good decisions require a thorough knowledge of the problem itself and the possibilities 
for its solution; while the importance of the second condition is intrinsic to the original project brief 
While it is clear that the availability of effectively accessible information low down in the bureaucratic 
tree can enable effective decision making in a highly variable and sensitive social context, two 
associated aspects - accountability and knowledge collection - deserve some attention. 
3.1 Accountability in a system of dispersed decision making 
The Bureau, reasonably, is concerned to minimise the possibility of being required to answer for 'bad' 
decisions - whether to the public through the Media, or parliament or its Minister. But how great is 
this danger in practice? 
Exposure falls into two categories: 
• a single bad decision may be made which has the effect of causing immediate and acute 
disadvantage to a client. 
• A single bad decision, or a senes of bad decisions, may be made which result in invalid 
expenditure. 
The first form of exposure can, of course, be minimised by denying the right for such decisions to be 
made on-the-spot - in essence, through the simple expedient of an overarching 'Golden Rule' that the 
immediate wenbeing of the client always takes priority. Having applied first-aid, responsibility for a 
sensitive decision may be passed up the hierarchy. 
The second form of exposure is less immediate, more diffuse and, in the current situation very difficult 
to detect - indeed, it was this exposure which led to the initiation of the project described in this paper. 
The exposure, as the Bureau clearly saw ab initio, may be minimised by monitoring behaviour within 
the system - and such behaviour can only be effectively monitored to the extent that there exists a 
body of reliable, accessible and analysable data. The law of diminishing returns suggests that the 
analysis undertaken by the Bureau should be automated where possible and that human intervention 
within the p-ocess should be based on "exceptions". In essence, one can mine a database seeking 
patterns and anomalies. 
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3.2 The "technical" solution 
We were led, then, towards the development of a database which would support decision making by 
all actors in the system. The design of such a database is, in no sense, conceptually or technically 
novel - it may readily be built following the principles of Object-Oriented or Relational Database 
design. In this instance we recommended a relational approach based, primarily, upon the existing 
systems infrastructure and skills and experience base of the IT Branch of the Bureau. Formally 
designed databases support both pre-specified and ad-hoc extraction, structuring and analysis suitable 
to support decision making by a broad range of actors in a broad range of contexts. For example, it 
would allow the Bureau to break the constraints of the "silo structure" and build a cross-scheme 
picture of the range of support being provided to one or more individuals and to a (potentiaD Client to 
identify the range of support services potentially available to hirnlher. 
While the design of such a database, in itself, is not challenging, we have alluded already to a range of 
social and technical issues which impact significantly on the problem of data collection including: 
• Geographic dispersal 
• Variable supporting telecommunications infrastructure (in many areas of rural and regional 
Australia, only 4800 baud data services are available) 
• Generally poor levels of computer literacy within the Agencies 
• Limited technical support availability 
• Amongst ultimate care providers, suspicion of technology and concerns about being monitored. 
We sought, therefore, to collect the necessary data while minimising the impact on work practices of 
the ultimate care givers and making the least possible demands on technological infrastructure. 
Service delivery data may be captured either directly (at the point of the transaction) or indirectly. 
Service delivery data was already being collected indirectly - though unfortunately the data was not 
filtering through to the Bureau in a way which supported timely and accurate decision making by the 
various actors, or satisfactory monitoring by the Bureau. 
Monitoring the hours of service provided to each consumer is central to the satisfactory operation of 
the HBS. There are three important reasons for this: 
• consumers may (and do) save up of support against a forthcoming period of temporarily increased 
need. Consumers are strongly motivated to manage their hours effectively, since the consequence 
of HBS support proving inadequate is typically institutionalisation; 
• Agencies need to record the hours of service provided to each consumer - they must of course 
report this to the Bureau - but, in any event, it is essential that the Agency and the consumers are 
in agreement on the hours available to each consumer; 
• Care-providers are normally hourly paid and thus the hours worked must be recorded for salary 
purposes. 
The process currently in operation at a typical Agency is as follows: Periodically (normally weekly or 
fortnightly), each care-provider is given a scheduled time sheet, nominating for each visit: client, start 
and finish time, and duties. At the end of the period, the time sheet, adjusted from 'scheduled' to 
'actual' is submitted by the care-provider to the agency to form the basis of both pay for the care-giver 
and adjustment of the clients' records. It was at this point that we suggested collecting the data for the 
proposed KM system - the time sheets form the oosis of data input. Consequently, data collection in 
respect of HBS could occur with little or no disruption to existing work practices. However, the 
intrinsic motivation for the accurate recording of attendance in HBS is not, unfortunately, shared by 
DARC. From the DARC client's perspective, hours cannot be saved up and a lack of availability of a 
day program does not normally signal inevitable institutionalisation. Nonetheless, the Bureau already 
require accurate recording of attendance. We suggested an approach to reporting, based around a 
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simple attendance register. Capturing register infonnation and submitting it, on a weekly or 
fortnightly basis, to the Department in computer readable fonn is not a particularly onerous task, 
especially since it replaces the previous data collection mechanisms. 
Due to the variable telecommunications infrastructure and technical experience, competence and 
support available to Agencies a consistent approach to the transmission of the data collected from the 
Agency to the Bureau is problematic. Transmission may occur in any of four ways: 
• via the Internet 
• by direct telephone connection to the Department's system 
• via physical transfer of data on floppy disk 
• by paper report - least satisfactory since the Bureau must then key the data into the system. 
Security and privacy are beyond the scope of this paper but they are, of course, concerns when we 
consider transmission of data. Data being transmitted from the Agencies to the Bureau are not, in fact, 
sensitive, but access to the knowledge base within the Agencies does require the transmission of 
potentially sensitive material. 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND KCOMMENDATIONS 
In this paper, we have described a feasibility study into an eHealth initiative within the context of the 
provision of health and social services in Australia as a means of exemplifying the complex nature of 
such contexts and the importance of broad and holistic analysis before committing to technology-
intensive "solutions". The case allows us to draw some conclusions about the nature of this type of 
system, and more broadly, recommendations for developers of e-govemance systems, into which this 
type of eHealth system fits . 
Understanding such contexts is increasingly important as e-govemance becomes more pervasive. It is 
clear that the lessons of early inter-organisational systems development and eCommerce adoption 
apply once more. Organisations associated with B2B and B2C systems have been through (or are 
fmding their way through) the teething pains assQCiated with issues of trust, reliability, privacy, 
security, and the change in power relationships brought by such systems (see, for example Chellappa 
and Pavlou, 2002; Farquhar et al 1998; Fung and Lee, 1999; Pavlou, 2003; Stone and Stone, 1990). 
Government related services, however, touch all parts of society, including those who do not have 
experience with these issues: and it is these, as we have demonstrated within the case, that are critical, 
rather than technical issues. At the same time, systems in this sphere must comply with emerging 
policy and regulation in this area (for example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act in the USA, which requires healthcare providers to protect patients' privacy), which contributes to 
the complexity of the context involved. 
From a technical point of view, this example highlights what is likely to be a prevalent issue in the 
development of such systems. As they encompass a mix of organisations with differing infonnation 
delivery maturity levels, simple data management is problematic. In the case of DHS, they had too 
much data and not enough infonnation in usable fonn. While health administration standardization 
initiatives such as the Electronic Health Record (EHR) , which can be seen as a parallel to EDI 
development in business, may ultimately help resolve data exchange issues in some ways, they also 
bring up the EDI standards compliance problems all over again. Rather than typifying the next 
generation of ''e-'' systems, enabled by advances in technology and built on the organisational maturity 
resulting from existing successful e-(business) system participation, these systems represent a step 
sideways, or even backwards. Rushing to technological solutions in this area is therefore particularly 
fraught. 
Although the technical solution ultimately ended up being straight forward, from a systems 
development point of view ensuring that the problem was correctly identified was less so. Systems 
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development and requirements engineering has moved steadily from treating systems as purely 
technical problems and towards approaches which acknowledge the social aspect of information 
systems (Mumford's ETHICS, in addition to Checkland's SSM being the prime examples of socio-
organisational and socio-technical methods), as well as acknowledging and helping to facilitate 
increased user interaction and participation (e.g. Alexander 1999; McCauley 1996, 1999). An 
investigative style based on these underpinnings turned out to be the correct approach: SSM enabled 
us to successfully examine a case in which a symptom was mistaken for a problem and showed how a 
high-tech eHealth proposal (based around smartcardlsmartdevice technology) to resolve that symptom 
was in fact likely to lead to socio-organisational dysfunction. Our analysis, based upon a Soft Systems 
Methodological foundation lead to a proposal for a lower-tech underpinned change which could: 
• support the various actors in the Human Services Provision System by offering appropriate and 
timely information, which together with guidelines (as opposed to rules) supports effective 
distributed decision making 
• help to unify the various perspectives from which the actors view human service provision 
• allow both decisions and service provision to be monitored centrally, both on an ad hoc and on an 
exception reporting basis, in a timely and effective manner and at an appropriate granularity. 
The highly diffused, fragmented, interlocking organisational structure of social service administration 
was a major impediment to the effective building and sharing of knowledge. Outsourcing and 
instability added to these difficulties. Many of these impediments were the result of political, 
administrative and organisational practices which were difficuh to overcome but what was more 
significant was that meaningful and important knowledge was not simply reducible to descriptions of 
service allocation and service provision. The context of service provision is as complex as is the 
relationship (often a long-term one) between the service providers and their clients. This case 
highlights the need for focus on socio-technical methods for the development of e-governance related 
systems, in which the context is the most complex and critical component. 
Consequently, we argued that an effective information system for this organisational network which 
would manage the informal and tacit knowledge (polyani, 1966) which is both distributed among 
many stakeholders and highly contextual, is a more effective that a response based on control through 
structured feedback. In an area where there is such sensitivity and the personal and interpersonal 
issues are so central to the well-being of the clients, data or knowledge management initiatives have 
the potential to be integrative or disruptive, with either positive or negative consequences for 
vulnerable clients and the organisational network as a whole. 
In terms of implications for requirements engineers working on e-governance projects, the case 
highlights issues of process and team composition. The inter-disciplinary make-up of the team was 
crucial, and the role of the facilitator in the elicitation/interview process was also critical (McCauley, 
1999). In particular, having the role of facilitator be taken on an alternating basis by the 2 primary 
investigators (a sociologist, and a systems analyst / requirements engineer), allowed for a composite 
worldview of the problem to be built. The team coming to a shared understanding of the context was 
key, and changing facilitators / lead interviewers allowed them to build their own individual 
understanding of the problem, which could then be integrated. This had several benefits: 
o a single perspective did not dominate the interviews and development of the team's 
understanding. Consequently, richer perspectives on complex issues such as the agencies trust 
in the government were built 
o users who were interviewed more than once experienced questions from differing foci / 
worldviews, which helped them to reframe or reconsider the same Esue from different points 
of view, thus facilitating a richer elicitation process 
We would argue that the case described here is not an isolated example, but rather is illustrative, of the 
issues which will be important in the development of e-governance systems. It illustrates issues likely 
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to be relevant in the development of such systems, and reconfmns the validity of fundamental 
principles of the Information Systems discipline - the interdependency of social, organisational, 
political and technical aspects in systems analysis. 
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